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their EU integration. Studying the different practices of deposit insurance in the 
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to increasing moral hazard, incentives deformation and increasing costs of banking 
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Introduction 
 
The recovery of the banking intermediation in Central and East Europe in 
the beginning of the 90's was followed by the establishment of modern deposit 
insurance (DI) systems. First of all, this was imposed by the particular importance of 
financial stability in these countries which experienced banking crises and panic that 
caused considerable loss of income and credibility in the banking system (see. Tang et 
al., 2000, Enoch et al., 2002.). Those crises were results of a complex of causes 
among which the whole transition dynamics and the role of the banking 
intermediation in the loss accumulation practice (which is related to the deep 
processes of income accumulation and distribution). A major factor that contributed 
to the crises is the contradiction between the discretional monetary and fiscal policies 
on the one hand, and the weak banking regulation, on the other hand. A further reason 
for the establishment of the new DI schemes was the EU integration and the 
requirement for harmonization (Directive 91/19 EC of 30 May 1994).  
The common problems of DI (moral hazard, adverse selection, agency 
problems, incentive-compatibility, cost of intermediation)
1 gain a particular meaning 
in the transition countries. It is of particular interest to study the DI practices in the 
accession countries (AC) from the point of view of their potential impact on the euro 
when after being integrated. 
In this study we set our task to make a basic comparison of the DI systems in 
10 AC (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) looking for some common and specific features, 
assessing the current level of harmonization to the EU and further development. At 
the same time, we will try to find an answer to two questions: (i) whether there is 
overinsurance of deposits in accession countries, and (ii) what the impact of deposit 
guarantee in those countries over the system of the euro area would be. 
                                                 
1 For theoretical aspects of DI and financial regulation as a whole see the discussion in Economic 
Journal (1996), particularly Dowd (1996), Benston and Kaufman (1996) and Dow (1996), as well as 
Garcia (1999) and Dale (2000). Concerning the role of DI in the system of financial regulation see 
Llewellyn (2001) and on the specificities of deposit guaranty in the financial system of accession 
countries - Hermes and Lensink (2000), Scholtens (2000). For a detailed description of financial sector 
development in transition economies during the first decade see Bonin and Wachtel (2002) and 
Thimann, C. (2002). 2 
Our hypothesis says that the process of mechanically carried out nominal 
harmonization of the DI systems out of the context of the real condition of the 
economies and of the banking systems, could impose great costs to the EU. The 
nominal and real overinsurance could lead to increased general risk level in the 
financial system, to lower efficiency of the banking intermediation, and as a whole to 
larger disproportions within the euro area. 
In section one we first make a brief review of the EU Directive on DI and 
present a detailed study of the features of the DI systems in AC on the basis of their 
legislation and a survey
2. In the following section we argue that deposits in the AC 
are overinsured with supporting evidence in nominal and real terms as well as in the 
future development of DI in line with EU integration process. Moreover we regard the 
overinsurance in the context of banking system development and supervision. In the 
third section, we describe some possible channels, through which this overinsurance 
could influence the financial system in the euro area.  
 
I.  Deposit insurance in Accession Countries  
As we have already mentioned AC replaced the implicit DI practice 
(inherited from the planned economy) with the explicit kind of system in the mid 90's. 
The old DI system was characterized by no formal agreement (central bank law, 
banking law or other constitution) despite the existing de facto deposit protection 
provided by government guarantees. Since most AC experienced banking crises and 
lack of credibility during transition, they were strongly encouraged to introduce DI by 
the EU requirement for reliable deposit guarantee mechanism. That's why the 
establishment of the new system in most of these countries follows the Directive 
94/19/EC of 30 May 1994, which intends to harmonize EU deposit insurance practice 
(EC, 1994). 
Among all, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the first to introduce the 
explicit  DI (in 1993 and 1994 respectively) in line with the dynamics of their 
transition processes and in response to their banking sector development.
3 Most of 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of the comparative analysis the Bulgarian National Bank circulated a survey among 
all 10 AC DI Funds.  
3 Among all other economies, the Czech Republic has the largest banking system (as a percentage of 
GDP), which is partly due to the existence of a significant banking system under the socialist regime, 3 
others AC set up the new DI practice in 1995 and 1996 soon after the approval of the 
Directive with the view to provide explicit deposit protection in their fragile banking 
sectors. Some of AC suffered from banking crises like Lithuania and did not gained 
credibility, while others like Poland, Slovakia, Romania just took measures to boost 
banking intermediation and precautions against bank panic in the large scale banking 
restructuring. From a different point of view, the establishment of the explicit DI at 
that time could be interpreted in the light of their commitment to the EU integration 
process. Estonia joins the group in 1998 after the stock market crash and banking 
restructuring. And Slovenia is the last to introduce the deposit guarantee scheme in 
2001 due to the delayed process of banking privatization and the low level of foreign 
ownership presence in the banking system
4. 
To a great extent EU Directive predetermine the design of DI systems in 
countries negotiating for EU accession, which comply with EU requirement in 
principle. Despite the trend toward harmonizing the legal framework, various 
countries still differ in how they treat individual versus corporate deposits, how the 
view co-insurance issues, risk-adjusted premiums, size of cover, and institutional 
features (whether there is a special body managing the scheme, its legal status and 
scope of powers, the manner in which funds for deposit protection are raised and 
managed). All these features should be considered as country specific although the 
process of EU integration is aiming to leave no space for free choice among them 
except credit institutions' contributions so far, which is more or less determined by the 
volume and characteristics of deposit creation process and banking stability. 
Apart from being established in a relatively short period of time, the DI in 
AC has other similarities. Another common feature is a special body managing the 
scheme. Slovenia is a special case, where the scheme is run by the central bank. All 
other DI systems are identified with a permanent fund managed by a legal entity 
which administration could be either mixed (private and official) or only official 
(Slovenia and Latvia). Mixed or joint administrations are usually administered by 
private or non-government agencies and they have limited authorities i.e. their 
decisions should be approved by the central bank. The Deposit Guarantee Fund 
                                                                                                                                            
while Hungary in particular is characterized by a strong corporate sector with extensive access to 
financing abroad due to the high share of multinationals (Caviglia et al., 2002). 
4 The presence of foreign banks inevitably stimulates the introduction of similar DI systems like in 
their home countries. 4 
management in Latvia is ensured by the Financial and Capital Market Commission 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. 
Another common feature of the DI systems in all AC is that they all are 
mandatory and they cover credit institutions in the country and branches of home 
credit institutions abroad. Bare-bone DI schemes provide deposit guarantee only for 
deposit banks (Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic 
and Estonia
5), while other more sophisticated systems extend their scope to credit 
unions, savings and loan associations (Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary). The nationally 
recognized DI system usually covers also foreign banks' branches on its territory in 
case the home country of the foreign bank does not provide adequate deposit 
protection in terms of scope and size. Besides the compulsory DI, some countries 
provide  additional insurance. In the Czech Republic for instance, foreign bank 
branches may take out supplementary deposit insurance under a contract with the 
Fund if the DI system to which they are members does not provide the same level and 
size of protection. In Poland there is a contractual system that extends the guarantee 
cover beyond the minimum specified in the mandatory scheme. All subjects, rules, 
rights and obligations are specified in the agreement on establishment of contractual 
guarantee fund. Also in Slovakia, banks may insure their deposits over and above the 
level of deposit protection required by the law by taking out insurance with a legal 
entity authorized by the Ministry to carry on such business.  
Concerning the different kinds of deposits covered by the guarantee schemes 
most systems include natural and legal entities (residents and non-residents) deposits 
in national and foreign currency. With respect to the depositors, Romania is the only 
exception where only deposits of natural persons are protected, while in Estonia. 
Slovenia and Poland there is special treatment of different corporate depositors. 
Besides the ultimately excluded from protection deposits in the EU Directive, almost 
all 10 AC prefer to keep the scope of coverage limited and further exclude deposits of 
financial institutions, insurers, pension and insurance funds, privatization funds, 
government and government institutions, municipalities and others.
                                                 
5 The DI system in Estonia is the most developed one extending its coverage to funds deposited by 
clients of credit, investment institutions, and unit-holders of mandatory pension funds. However, there 
are three sectoral funds raised by different institutions and used for different purposes. 5 
Table 1. Basic characteristics of deposit insurance in accession countries 
Country Type 
explicit=1 
implicit=0 
Date 
Enacted 
Foreign 
Currencies 
(yes=1 no=0) 
Coverage 
Limit 
(EUR) 
Co-insurance 
yes=1    no=0 
Permanent fund
funded=1 
unfunded=0 
Premium or 
Assessment 
base 
Annual premiums (% of base)  Risk-
Adjusted 
Premiums 
yes=1 no=0 
Source of 
Funding 
private=1 
joint=2 
official=3 
Administration 
private=1 joint=2 
official=3 
Membership 
compulsory=1 
voluntary=0 
Bulgaria 1  1995  1  7669  0  1  insured 
deposits 
entry contribution is equal to 1% of bank's registered 
capital but no less than 100 000 BGN (51129 EUR); 
annual premium is 0.5% of the total amount of the 
deposit base for the preceding year 
0 2 2  1 
Czech 
Republic 
1 1994  1  25000  1  1  insured 
deposits 
annual premium for banks  - 0.1% of the average volume 
of insured deposits of the previous year, and 0.05% for 
building savings banks 
0 1 2  1 
Estonia 1  1998  1  2556  1  1  insured 
deposits 
entry fee equals  50 000 (3195 EUR); quarterly premiums 
of up to 0.125% (0.07% at present) of the insured 
deposits 
0 2 2  1 
Hungary 1  1993  1  12726  1  1  insured 
deposits 
entry fee - 0.5% of the registered; annual premium is up 
to 0.2% of the total amount of insured deposits 
1 2 2  1 
Latvia 1  1998 1  4920  0  1  insured 
deposits 
entry fee - 50 000 LVL (81994 EUR) for banks and 100 
LVL (164 EUR) for credit unions; quarterly premiums 
equal 0.05% of the insured deposits 
0 2 3  1 
Lithuania 1  1996  1  13033  1  1  insured 
deposits 
annual premium of 0.45% of the insured deposits for 
banks and foreign banks departments, and 0.2% for credit 
unions 
0 1 2  1 
Poland 1  1995  1  18000  1  1  deposits  and 
risk-adjusted 
assets 
annual premium of 0.4% of the total balance sheet assets 
and risk-weighted assets 
0 2 2  1 
Romania 1  1996  1  3156  0  1  insured 
deposits 
entry fee - 0.1% of the statutory capital of a bank; annual 
premium of 0.8% of total household deposits, and a 
special premium of 1.6% of total household deposits for 
banks conducting higher risk transactions.  
1 2 2  1 
Slovakia 1  1996  1  20000  0  1  insured 
deposits 
entry fee of 1,000,000 SKK (23923 EUR) for banks and 
100,000,000 SKK (2392344 EUR) for the central bank, 
quarterly premiums from 0.1% to 0.75% of the amount of 
insured deposits from the preceding quarter, and an 
extraordinary premium ranging from 0.1% to 1.0% of the 
amount if insured deposits of the preceding quarter . 
0 2 2  1 
Slovenia 1  2001  1  18250  0  0  insured 
deposits 
annual liabilities of 3.2% of guaranteed deposits held 
with the individual bank 
0 1 3  1 
 
Note: All data is valid at the end of 2002. The maximum coverage and entry fees are calculated on the basis of the exchange rate at the end of 2002. 
Source: National legislation, annual reports of national DIFunds and surveys. The layout of the table and content of indicators follows the one developed by Demirgic-Kunt 
and Sobaci (2000). 6 
Credit institutions' liabilities per depositor are set in terms of coverage limit, 
which varies across AC (see Table.1). Logically countries that are ahead in their 
negotiation process with the EU would score higher coverage limits like the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary
6. On the low-level side, there are 
Estonia, Romania
7, Latvia and Bulgaria. With respect to co-insurance issues, since 
the Directive permits EU member countries to decide whether to choose or avoid co-
insurance, equal number of AC either maintain or eliminate their existing co-
insurance systems by 2002. In Lithuania the coverage is constructed in the following 
way: 100% of the deposits up to EUR 3 000 with a credit institution per depositor, 
and 90% of the deposits from EUR 3 000 to EUR 13 033. In Poland the scheme is 
100% of the deposits up to EUR 1000 and 90% for the excessive amount up to EUR 
18 000 at the end of 2002. In Hungary the two level is: 100% of the deposit up to 
EUR 4242, and 90% of the exceeding amount up to EUR 12 726. Estonia covers only 
90% of the insured deposit up to EUR 2556 and the Czech Republic not more than 
EUR 25 000. 
The contributions collected for DI funds are diverse in types and size. There 
are mandatory annual premiums paid by commercial banks, but apart from them 
usually there are entry premiums (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and 
Slovakia), and under special circumstances special premiums are collected as well 
(Slovakia and Romania). The initial contribution is usually due soon after the opening 
of a new credit institution and it is quoted either as a percentage of the registered 
capital (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) or in nominal amount (Estonia, Latvia and 
Slovakia). It is interesting to note that in Slovakia the central bank participates in the 
DI system with an entry premium, and in Latvia both the budget and the central bank. 
The size of the annual premiums (some of them collected on quarterly basis) 
depends on the volume of insured deposits as they present percentage of the 
assessment or premium base. Among the countries with the highest annual premium 
percentage are Bulgaria (0.5% of the total amount of deposit base for the preceding 
year as the Fund may increase it but it may not exceed 1.5% of the deposit base), 
Romania (0.8% of total household deposits), and in Slovakia the premium paid on 
                                                 
6 The EU Directive provides for limiting the minimum guaranteed amount to a certain percentage of 
deposits which should not be less than 90% of the total deposited amount, and for the guarantee to be 
up to the amount of EUR 20 000. 7 
quarterly basis may vary from 0.1% to 0.75%. In the Czech Republic like in Lithuania 
there are different annual premiums for different credit institutions. In Hungary the 
maximum annual premium of 0.2% of the insured deposits has never been collected. 
In fact there are differentiated premiums depending on the size of deposits - 0.05% for 
deposits up to EUR 4242, 0.03% for deposits between EUR 4242 and EUR 25 452, 
and 0.005% for deposits in excess of EUR 25 452. The maximum annual premium in 
Poland is 0.4% and as of 1 January 2001 it is reduced by 50%. The amount of 
reduction is paid by the central bank. Finally, in Slovenia the maximum annual 
liabilities payable by an individual bank amounts to 3.2% of the guaranteed deposits 
held with the individual bank. Most commonly the assessment base includes only 
insured deposits but in the case of Poland it includes risk-adjusted assets as well. 
Little attention was paid to combating moral hazard through risk-adjusted 
premiums since only two out of 10 AC have this practice. In Hungary the system of 
increased premium payment is quite simple. It is based on the capital adequacy ratio 
and its legal maximum is 0.3% of the premium payment base. The risk-adjusted 
premium system in Romania provides a special premium of 1.6% of total household 
deposits for banks conducting higher risk transactions. The extraordinary premium in 
Slovakia ranging between 0.1% and 1.0% is due on dates specified by the Fund. 
As we have already mentioned there is a special body responsible for the 
management of the DI fund with the only exception of Slovenia. All these institutions 
are set explicitly by law and their functions are described in their statutes. The 
principal duties of all deposit guarantee institutes are to determine and collect the 
premiums, invest its assets and pay the guaranteed amount of deposits. Since deposit 
reimbursement is usually provoked by declaring a bank insolvent, Funds have some 
additional functions and powers provided by the law on bank bankruptcy. The Fund 
in Poland has a second explicit function apart from DI, which is in the context of bank 
failure avoidance. In fulfillment of its task, the Fund may without limitation extend to 
the entities covered by the deposit guarantee system, loans, guarantees or 
endorsements on conditions that are better than generally offered by banks. The 
financial assistance is provided from a special assistance fund which is minimum 
EUR 6 000 000 and a restructuring fund exceeding EUR 2 000 000, which is 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Since there is high inflationary pressure in Romania, the guarantee ceiling is updated half-yearly 
through the consumer price adjustment.  8 
extended to banks facing insolvency and banks acquiring or restructuring ones facing 
insolvency. In order to increase the reliability and stability of the financial sector, the 
Fund in Hungary may have other commitments like granting credits, subordinate 
loans, acquisition of ownership participation in a credit institution, providing cover 
for the transfer of stock deposits against adequate collateral.  
The management of the DI funds involves investment activities of the money 
raised by banks' contributions. Investment opportunities are limited by the law as a 
major part of the resources are most often invested in government securities. In 
Lithuania the Fund can invest only in government securities (only short-term 
securities in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and central banks of countries 
approved by the Fund Council, while in Latvia investments in securities issued by the 
central governments of the EU member states whose credit rating are not lower than 
that of Latvia, are allowed. Apart from placing money on deposits in credit 
institutions and on treasury bonds of EU member states, and to which investment 
ratings have been assigned, in Estonia the fund provided for deposit reimbursement 
can buy bonds or other debt securities which are listed on a stock exchange operating 
in EU member countries and the issuer of which has been assigned an investment 
grade credit rating by an internationally recognized rating agency designated by a 
resolution of the supervisory board of the Fund. In Bulgaria, the Fund can deposit 
money with the central bank and have short-term deposits with commercial banks that 
are authorized dealers of government securities. The Fund resources in Slovakia may 
be used for granting loans to banks for up to 10% of Fund's total assets only when 
administrators of the central bank have been appointed to the banks. In Slovenia there 
is no centralized management of the fund but there is a special requirement for the 
banks' investment activities in order to provide liquid assets required for the payment 
of the guaranteed deposits. The bank shall invest as a minimum assets in the amount 
of 2.5% of the guaranteed deposits in bills of the Bank of Slovenia, short-term debt 
securities issued by the Republic of Slovenia and foreign marketable debt and equity 
securities whose issuer is awarded the long-term rating of no less than BBB (Standard 
& Poor's) or at least Baa2 (Moody's). 
In some laws it is clearly stated what the Fund should do in case its 
resources become insufficient for the payment of insured and becoming inaccessible 
deposits. There are three DI systems which are entirely funded by the private sector 9 
(The Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovenia). Apart from the credit institutions' 
contributions, in the Czech Republic additional resources can be raised on the market. 
In Lithuania, where there are sectoral insurance funds, when the DI fund is short of 
resources while the other has such resources, insurance compensations may be paid 
by the fund possessing the resources. There is no permanent fund in Slovenia; hence 
the central bank can temporarily finance it until the contributions of the banks are 
collected. In the other seven countries the additional resources are collected either 
from official or private sources. 
 
II.  Overinsurance in Accession Countries 
 
As we have seen from the comparative study of the different DI systems in 
AC, some countries have already coverage limits close or above the EU Directive 
protection guaranteed level (for example the Czech Republic and Slovakia). If we do 
not look at nominal but rather at relative coverage or coverage ratio the picture of 
overinsurance is clearer. Assuming for best practice the principle of optimal coverage 
of deposits of about 1- 2 times GDP per capita, and taking into account that the 
indicator for the euro area (1.44) is lower than the world average (Garcia, 1999)
8, it is 
obvious that the average coverage ratio of the studied AC (2.8) is above the optimal 
world level and much higher than the euro area level (about 2 time the ratio for the 
euro area). In relative or real terms overprotection spreads among other countries as 
well like Bulgaria (3.68) and Lithuania (3.08) which in nominal terms do not seem to 
be overprotected. The accession country under study, which has the lowest cover ratio 
is Estonia (0.51). Estonia obtained this level after negotiations with EU. 
                                                 
8 Garcia (1999) makes a review of the best practice in deposit insurance on the basis of a survey of 182 
IMF member countries. A prior study was rendered by Kyei (1995). On the practice in EU countries, 
see Gropp and Vesala (2001).  10 
Table 2 Coverage ratio of deposits in accession and the euro area 
country Coverage  ratio 
Bulgaria 3.68 
Czech Republic  3.51 
Estonia 0.51 
Hungary 1.79 
Latvia 1.35 
Lithuania 3.08 
Poland 3.61 
Romania 1.58 
Slovakia 4.19 
Slovenia 1.56 
AC 2.49 
Euro area  1.44 
Note: Ratio of the coverage limit to the GDP per capita at the end of 2002. 
 
 
 
 
Note: PPS (purchasing power standards) is an artificial currency that allows for variations between the national price level not taken into 
account by exchange rates. This unit improves data comparability (Eurostat). 
Raw data source: National DIFunds, National statistical institutes, European Commission. 
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At the same time it is interesting to note that in the course of time some of 
them go or plan to go beyond the minim requirement of the EU Directive (table 3). 
After 1999, the prohibition of high export coverage was eliminated and now there is 
no maximum guarantee limit, which allows for nominal and real overprotection 
although this could create moral hazard. Another factors related to the problem of 
deposit overinsurance in AC (and later on in the euro area) are the weak co-insurance 
practice and lack of risk-adjusted premiums. By 2002 only half of the AC observe the 
co-insurance principle in their systems (Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Estonia) while there are only two imposing risk-adjusted premiums to 
the credit institutions. Although considered for best practice, it is not stimulated by 
the EU Directive
9, and it is expected to be abandoned by the few AC in the process of 
their legal harmonization with respect to deposit insurance. 
                                                 
9 During the negotiations leading to the Directive, German views prevailed and the proposal for a 
mandatory ceiling on protection and for a requirement for co-insurance was rejected, on the grounds 
that the dangers of moral hazard argument had been overstated (Garcia and Prast, 2002). 12 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Development of the coverage limit in accession countries 
Years    2002     2003      2004   2005    2006    2007         2008 
Bulgaria         7 670                              11 250                                     20 042                                     
Estonia           2 556         6 391                                    12 782                                                    20 000 
Lithuania      13 033                              14 484                                                          17 380       20 000 
Latvia             4 920                               9 839                                    14 760                             21 319 
Hungary     12 726                               24 500 
Slovenia      18 250                    22 161 
Poland          18 000        22 500 
Note: Coverage limit in EUR calculated on the base of the exchange rate at the end of 2002.  
Source: Surveys and national legislation. 
 13 
Furthermore, this coverage has to be analyzed jointly with such characteristics 
of AC banking systems as the low share of deposits to GDP (compare to the euro area 
as a whole). There are great differences among AC, which are determined by the real 
conditions of the banking sector in each of them, and even taken as an average, euro 
area has 2 times higher ratio of deposits to GDP than AC. In all AC dominant 
presence of foreign banks (primarily from the EU) is observed and this fact is closely 
related to the development of the nominal guarantee limit in those countries. This 
could be explained by the interrelationship that the higher the share of foreign 
ownership of the banking system, the closer the coverage limit to the euro area 
practice.  
Another indicator, which is an important factor in banking supervision and 
safety net features, is the capital adequacy of commercial banks. In the AC under 
study solvency ratio is de jure and de facto considerably higher than the international 
standards (Table 4). Furthermore, in the context of setting the optimal guarantee level, 
we should consider also the fact that the majority of the deposits in AC is fully 
covered, because of their small size, i.e the distribution of deposits in accession 
countries is shifted towards small deposits much more than in developed countries 
and the euro area.  
 
Table 4 Indicators of the banking systems in accession countries 
Country  Total capital adequacy ratio (%) 
Law provision          Practice 
Deposits/GDP 
(%) 
Foreign ownership 
(% of total assets) 
          
Bulgaria 12  25.2  26.1 70
Czech Republic  8  14.2  65.4 94
Estonia 10  15.3  33.8 98
Hungary 8  12.5  35.9 65
Latvia 10  13.1 23.9 62
Lithuania 10  14.8  20.2 86
Poland 8  14.5  37.5 69
Romania 12  25.0  17.6 55
Slovakia 8  21.1  55.4 90
Slovenia 8  11.9  49.8 16
Euro area  8  12.0  79.2
Note and source: Data for total capital adequacy ratio and deposits to GDP ratio at the end of 2002 except for 
Hungary, when the figure is valid at June 2002: National legislation, Annual reports. Deposits in euro area include 
demand (overnight) deposits, deposits with agreed maturity and deposits redeemable at notice in other MFIs, and 
deposits in AC include demand, time, savings and foreign currency deposits: IFS. Data of foreign ownership share 
of total banking assets at the end of 2001: Thimann, C. (2002), and Annual reports.  
14 
Taking all these factors together and looking at the whole picture, we have 
come up with the results that DI in AC is considerably over the optimal level not only 
in quantitative measures but also in the context of the overall development of the 
banking systems in AC. Thus, the topping-up provision
10 does not seem to have a 
strong positive effect on the euro area banking system (if any positive effect at all) 
since all AC will have reached the EU directive minimum level or even go beyond it. 
Moreover, it is not likely that an accession bank branches (if they expend at all) could 
impose some risk over the euro area banking system (due to their lower than the host 
country guarantee level) since most of them are foreign owned and there is a deep 
ongoing process of banking mergers and acquisitions. 
 
III.  Possible consequences of the overinsurance 
 
The consequences of the overinsurance could be interpreted in the light of the 
classical problems of DI – moral hazard, banking intermediation incentives as well as 
its costs. What makes those problems particular is that these consequences are not 
only on the account of the AC but at the expenses of the EU as a whole. 
11.  
First, we can presume that moral hazard in EU banking system will increase
12, 
and hence, system risk can rise instead of decreasing
13.  
The high level of DI is to some extent a continuation of the full deposit 
guarantee during the socialist times (a kind of path dependence), when the banking 
system was state-owned, saving deposits were limited and centralized in saving banks 
of the each country. In spite of the banking shake-up in the 90s, economic agents still 
believe that they can rely on the implicit assistance of the state in case of a crisis, and 
as a whole they are willing to take a higher risk against relatively lower returns 
(comparing to the behavior of the economic agents in the euro area). This is true not 
                                                 
10 EC (2001) Report on the operation of the "topping-up" provision of the Directive on Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes says that the general argument for keeping topping up provision (either host- or 
home-country) in the years to come is that it might be especially important during the enlargement 
process of the EU. 
11 Undoubtedly there would be certain macroeconomic consequences on the level of the common 
monetary policy conducted by ECB, and on the fiscal policy synchronization process since while the 
monetary policy is centralized, the banking supervision stays on a national level. 
12 Theoretical foundations of moral hazard development under banking regulation are discussed by 
Freixas and Rochet (1999); see. also Calomiris (1999).  
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only for the depositors who place their money with more unstable banks against 
higher interest rates, and for the banks as well, that would put their money on risky 
and potentially failing investments. And most empirical studies (with some 
exceptions) find a positive relationship between the level of DI and the probability of 
bank crisis outbreak (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)).  
The increase of bank crisis probability in accession countries, ceteris paribus, 
combined with the high presence of big European banks, could be potentially 
translated into an increased probability of crisis in the whole European banking 
system. Here we have also to mention the fact that exchange rate regimes in AC are 
more inclined to fixed one (ERM II or the Currency boards), and considering higher 
share of foreign deposits (known as a “liability dolarization”) (see. Table 4), a 
hypothetical bank crisis would incur considerably higher costs (remember the 2001 
crisis in Argentina).  
As a whole, in the case of potential problems, the costs of overcoming the 
crisis would be asymmetric – the richer countries in the EU would endure much more 
expenses coming than the poorer new members. 
Second, there is a close link between the increased moral hazard and the 
problems of oppressing and deforming the incentives in the banking system and the 
diminishing competition efficiency of EU banking system.  
One of the purposes of the nominal harmonization of the European legislation 
in the filed of DI is to avoid competition among national banking systems via DI. In 
fact, in the presence of different real deposit coverage (as a ratio to the GDP per 
capita), the banks in the accession countries are “punished” in terms of the higher 
expenses they bear. This because it is not likely that the higher level of DI in 
accession countries will attract deposits form the EU countries (this way enjoying 
economy of scale in raising funds). The overinsurance of deposits in the accession 
countries (combined with the higher capital adequacy requirements) would cause 
higher costs for banking intermediation not only in AC but also in the euro area as a 
whole. The more expensive banking intermediation would reflect on the efficiency of 
the entire European banking system.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
13 About the relation between DI and systemic risk see Llewellyn (2001). On one hand, deposit 
guarantee protects against bank panic (in the model of Diamond and Dybvig) i.e. systemic risk  
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Conclusion 
 
The close study of the DI systems in the AC shows that those countries are 
really overinsured from a purely quantitative point of view as well as from the 
perspective of the European banks presence in these countries and the strength of the 
banking regulation. This inevitably leads to increasing moral hazard, competition 
distortion and to higher costs not only those countries but in the whole euro area. 
Having in mind the functioning of the UE (the distribution process), the old and rich 
members will incur much more expenses.  
Hence, meeting mechanically the requirements for nominal harmonization
14, 
which are not in compliance with the real development of the AC, could have an 
adverse result - increasing probability of financial crisis and decreasing efficiency of 
the European banking system. The problems that will be encountered by the common 
fiscal and monetary policies will not be minor and could not be discarded (we do not 
describe them here).  
A possible solution (despite the advancing harmonization process), would be 
the linkage of DI coverage with GDP dynamics and with some indicators of the 
banking system of AC. Such reconsideration of the DI convergence process would 
benefit not only the accession countries but also the EU as a whole.  
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